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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
TRACY BROWN,
Plaintiff-A

ppellant,

vs.

Case No.

DANNIE MARRELLI,
Defendant-Respondent.

13348

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
S T A T E M E N T O F CASE
AND DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
This is a civil paternity suit. The lower court
granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State of Utah commenced a bastardy action
against defendant on plaintiff's complaint on the 7th
day of July, 1972, Salt Lake County Criminal No.
24599. During the course of this prosecution plaintiff's
parents became apprehensive as to whether the case
would be vigorously prosecuted (R.4) and hence plain-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
tiff's father employed Ralph Sheffield, attorney at law
of St. George, Utah to work with John B. Anderson,
the Deputy District Attorney who was handling the
case in the interest of plaintiff. Even so, vital and
critical evidence and arguments were not presented to
the jury and as a result the defendant was found "not
guilty."
The evidence and arguments which were not presented to the jury were the following:
1. The explanation as to why plaintiff did not
tell defendant nor anyone else about her pregnant condition until the fifth month after intercourse. (R.40)
The absence of this evidence allowed the defense
counsel to argue as follows:
"The glaring thing in this testimony, if
this young man had intercourse with her, which
he expressly denies, she, by her own testimony,
knew where he lived, what he was doing, having
called him, so she knew what his number was,
but she goes through January, February,
March, April, May until the middle of June,
indicating, and that on my question, I said,
'When did you know you were pregnant?'
And she said when she went to see the doctor
on the 23rd of June."
2. The facts that plaintiff and defendant had
been alone and kissing on three or four occasions
(R. 7, 8) prior to the act of intercourse which resulted
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in pregnancy (T. 93) As a result defendant's counsel
argued in the State case as follows:
"That's the only time she ever claims they
had been together. Never been out together,
never had a date. (T 150,1 28-30)
3. The evidence of plaintiffs attending physician
that the baby was born sioc days prior to the eoopected
date, that the baby's physical condition was entirely
consistent with her birth 259 days after intercourse and
the absence of bleeding on that occasion is consistent
with plaintiffs testimony that she was then a virgin.
(R.41)
The absence of such testimony enabled defendant's
counsel to argue as follows:
"The State has chosen, for reasons unknown to me, not to put on medical evidence
as to the possible time of conception, that sort
of thing. One thing I'll ask you people to do,
and you are allowed under these instructions
to use your own common sense, your own experience and inferences arising therefrom to
determine where the truth lies in this matter.
The testimony by Miss Brown is that the only
time she was ever alone with Dannie Marrelli
was on or about the 8th or 9th of January. The
baby was born on the 25th of September. I
think if you'll take the 22 days remaining in
January, the number of days in February,
March, April, May, June, July, August, and
25 days in September, you will find on that
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basis, a 259-day pregnancy. Of course, as I say,
the State hasn't chosen to give us any medical
evidence as to whether this was a term birth
or pre-term birth. There is no evidence before
you as to the length of time for a term birth.
However, in selecting this jury, I noted, and
I'm sure Mr. Anderson did, and the judge, that
each of you are sitting in the box at the present
time have one or more children. I think you
have had some experience with these things."
(T 146, 147)
4. Testimony of David Barton and Wayne Lam'
bert that they had not had seooual intercourse with her
at any time. (R )
Defendant's counsel inferred that one of them
might well be the father. H e argued:
"Now, the only basis that we have for
believing this woman hadn't had intercourse
with other people, there are two of them, (1)
she said she hadn't and (2) she claims she
wasn't going out with any people during that
time. Of course, her mother remembered people
she had gone out with during that time. She
had gone to ball games. She was going to
dances. Is it reasonable to believe that this
young lady, when she found out she was in
trouble, worried about it for a period of five
months, possibly talked to someone else, and
possibly someone else was out of town and then
went to the person she admits she wanted to
be introduced t o . . . " (T 149)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5. Mrs. Marrelli was not called as a witness even
though she was present during a meeting of the mother,
the alleged father and their parents.
Some people won't lie under any circumstances,
not even in aid of their kin. Mrs. Marrelli is probably
one of them as it seems certain that she would have been
a witness for her son (as her husband was) if the
testimony she would give would have been favorable
to him. This should have been evident when the defense
failed to call her. Had she been called as a rebuttal
witness (to testify that the defendant did acknowledge
being the father as Tracy (T 49), her mother (T 76)
and her father (T 124) had testified but which the
defendant (T 99 and his father denied (T 117) but
disappointed the State's counsel in not contradicting
her son and her husband there would nevertheless have
been a positive benefit to the State's case as it would
have emphasized the fact that such a meeting did indeed
take place and why would a boy who denied being the
father first meet with the mother to be and her father
(T 102) then with both grandfathers to be (T 116)
and finally with the mother to be and all the grandparents to be (T 119) if in fact he was not the father?.
That Mrs. Marrelli was actually at the last referred to
meeting could not have been denied by her without discrediting her son who had so testified (T 103) and her
husband who had so testified (T 119). It should also be
noted that all these meetings took place two days after
Tracy told Dannie he was the father (T 102).
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6. The State's attorney objected to defense counsel's request of his client as to why he attended all the
above meetings if he had not had intercourse with Tracy.
Q. (Attorney Sumner J. Hatch) "Mr. Marrelli,
if you are sure you are not the father of that child,
why did you go to those meetings ?"
Mr. Anderson: "I'll object as to the materiality."
Court: "Sustained. Well, its otherwise objectionable."
Thus the jury was deprived of the answer to what
was probably the most significant question that could
be asked of the defendant and the State was foreclosed
from discrediting that answer and from dwelling on the
implausability of the defendant attending all those meetings if he could not have been the father when that
meeting was about the father's responsibility.
7. Absence of rebuttal argument to defendant's
counsel argument that pldintiff was not telling the truth
about defendant asking her to bring her year book to
his dormitory room so they could pick out a girl for his
roommate since his roomate already had a Skyline High
School year book. (T. 151)
Rebuttal arguments that should have been made:
(1) Defendant admitted that plaintiff did bring a year
book (R 91). (2) If he wanted to get plaintiff into
his room for immoral purposes it wouldn't matter
whether he really wanted to see the year book or not,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(3) his roommate graduated in a class two years before
plaintiff so it was an entirely different year book.
(R

)

As a consequence defendant's counsel made this
argument to the jury: "She comes up and says, 'I want
to show you the yearbook'. (T. 151) H e testifies there
was a yearbook of the same year and school there at
the time. Why would he want her to bring a yearbook?
He's watching the football game."
And that argument was never challenged! Since
credibility was the key issue this item may well have
been the deciding factor.
In as much as the camplaint in question was dismissed without any evidentary hearing, the references to
the record (R) or transcript (T) where the facts as
plaintiff claims them to be established are not proof of
those facts as no testimony or documents were introduced into evidence. The purpose of making them part
of the record is to show by affidavits what proof is
available to sustain plaintiff's contention that she ought
not to be barred by the result of the prior proceedings
for reasons set forth in the argument to follow:
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS ERROR FOR T H E LOWER
C O U R T TO G R A N T D E F E N D A N T ' S M O T I O N
TO D I S M I S S W I T H O U T A L L O W I N G P L A I N -
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T I F F AN E V I D E N T I A R Y H E A R I N G
T H E D E F E N S E OF RES JUDICATA.

ON

The Order of Dismissal with Prejudice here appealed from is based on the grounds of res judicata
and granted pursuant to defendant's Motion to Dismiss
on that ground. Rule 12 (b) U.R.C.P. promises that
every defense shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter,
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency
or service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.
Clearly res judicata is not one of those grounds
for which such a motion lies and on which it can be
granted.
Rule 8 (c) on the other hand provides that res
judicata is one of the 19 specific affirmative defenses
that must be pleaded by the defendant in his Answer.
Here defendant had filed no answer. Here there has
been no hearing on the issues raised by such an answer.
Procedurally the order in question is in error and
should be reversed. However, unless plaintiff is also
right as to the substantive issue which follows there
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would be no benefit to anyone to remand the cause for
further proceeding, hence Point I I .
POINT II
P L A I N T I F F ' S P R E S E N T SUIT IS NOT
B A R R E D B Y R E S J U D I C A T A OR C O L L A T E RAL ESTOPPEL BECAUSE SHE
HAS
NEVER HAD A FAIR ADVERSARY PRESE N T A T I O N OF H E R CAUSE.
Res judicata is wisely grounded on the policy that
a party who has had one fair trial on an issue should
not have a second one. However, as the California
Supreme Court said in the case of Jorgensen v. Jorgenr
sen (1948), 32 Cal 2d 13, 18, 193 Pd 728, 732 (and
recently cited with approval in People v. Camp, 10 Cal
App 3d 651, app. 89 Cal. Reptr. 242 (1970), "This
policy must be considered together with the policy that
a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case."
The issue in question is within the scope of an A L R
Annotation on the subject, "Judgment in bastardy proceeding as conclusive of issues in subsequent bastardy
proceeding" published in 37 A L R 2d 836. None of the
cases cited therein, however, are sufficiently similar to
the facts in the instant case to be useful as precedents.
The author, however, declares, "There is nothing in the
nature of a bastardy proceeding which necessarily pre-
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vents the application therein of the general principle
that a final judgment on the merits is conclusive as between the same parties on the same issue in a later proceeding (P. 836, 837, emphasis added). Of course case
law is clear to the effect that persons who are privies
to the parties as well as the parties themselves are subject to the limitation of res judicata. In 46 Am J u r
2d 683, under Sec 532 of "Judgments'' it is stated:
"A trial in which one party contests his
claim against another should be held to estop
a third person only when it is realistic to say
that the third person was fully protected in the
first trial. There can be no such privity between persons as to produce collateral estoppel
unless the result can be defended on principles
of fundamental fairness in the due process
sense."
The real issue in this appeal is whether the results
in the prior State case "can be defended on principles
of fundamental fairness in the due process sense."
Bearing in mind that the control of the case was
primarily, if not entirely, in the hands of the District
Attorney and his assigned counsel, can it be said that
plaintiff was adequately represented by counsel in the
State trial? Certainly that issue has not been the subject
of any evidentiary hearing. Plaintiff submits that Rule
13 of U.R.C.P. requires such a hearing and proof by
defendant that she had such representation in fact in the
prior case before it bars her present suit.
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In the case of Alters v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118,
449 P 2d 241, this court held that a party convicted of
burglary and sentenced to serve a term of one to twenty
years in the Utah State Prison was entitled to a new
trial when his representation did not meet the requirements of due process. There this court said:
We are not here concerned with the creditability of petitioner's story. It might be said
that parts of it seem quite incredible, or even
foolish. But hindsight seem foolish even to
themselves. On the basis of this record, we
think the only reasonable conclusion to de drawn
therefrom is that if petitioner had had counsel
actively interested in protecting his rights the
result may have been more favorable to him.
The right of an accused to have counsel
as assured by Sec. 12, Art. I, Utah Constitution, and by the V I and X I V Amendments
to the U. S. Constitution is one of those rights
''rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people" as essential to the protection of individual liberties and therefore included in our
concept of due process of law. The requirement is not satisfied by a sham or pretense
of an appearance in the record by an attorney
who manifests no real concern about the interests of the accused. The entitlement is to
the assistance of a competent-member of the
Bar, who shows a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the defendant and
present such defense as are available to him
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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under the law and consistent with the ethics
of the profession.
The failure of such representation for the
petitioner herein is a departure from due process of law. This has been recognized as one
of the exceptions from the rule of finality of
judgments, and which may therefore be attacked collaterally under habeas corpus/' (Emphasis added, foot notes omitted)
Should one convicted of crime be entitled to greater
constitutional protection than the mother of an illegitimate child? Should an illegitimate child be less entitled
to his or her day in court than a presumably legitimate
child is entitled to the same rule of evidence needed to
convict one of crime? Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d
163, 340 P 2d 761.
It must be clearly understood that granting the
relief plaintiff is seeking would not open up the door
to retry every bastardy case that was lost by the County
Attorney hereafter (incidentally there have been only
29 acquitals in the past 22 years in the entire State of
Utah according to the official published reports for the
period July 1, 1948 to June 30, 1972. There were 625
bastardy trials reported in said publications) (See appendix). This case would be precedent for retrials only
when at least three other elements occur. First, no
one was told of the pregnancy for over five months
after the sex act occured so as to require a more careful
prosecution. Second, counsel for the mother failed to call
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the other males the alleged father linked to the complaining witness. Third, the mother's counsel failed to
call the attending physician when birth occured 259 days
after the act of intercourse.
It should be noted as to the factors just listed that
proof the those facts clearly appears from the transcript
of the State's prior case standing alone. (As to (1) T63.Asto (2) and ( 3 ) - T 2 )
This is a case of initial impression despite the dicta
in State v Judd 27 Utah 279, 493 P.2d 604, hence this
court is free to do justice between the parties so
long as its precedent does not establish a policy which is
inamicable to justice hereafter. As noted above, it is
almost certain that no other case will ever be retried as
a result of the decision in this case. But what about
justice to this particular defendant? Certainly, it was
not his fault nor his counsel's fault that the State's
case was so handled that plaintiff did not have her fair
day in court. Should he bear the expense of a second
trial? No. The equitable powers of the courts are such
that he who seeks equity should be required to do equity
and the defendant's expenses of a second trial including
reasonable attorney's fees should be assessed to the
plaintiff if he prevails or be deducted from the pay
ments he is ordered to make if plaintiff prevails.
CONCLUSION
The Order of Dismissal should be vacated and this
case remanded to the District Court of Salt Lake CounDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
ty with appropriate instructions relative to trial of the
issue of res judicata and the expenses of further proceedings if a new trial is found justified under the
Alters exception to the res judicata rule.
Respectfully Submitted
R O B E R T B. H A N S E N
838 - 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Appellant
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